CONCLUSION: THE MAKING OF THE SLAVS
As its title suggests, the subject matter of this book is not the Slavs, but the process leading to what is now as "the Slavs". This process was a function of both ethnic formation and ethnic identification. In both cases, the "Slavs" were the object, not the subject. The preceding chapters have presented a series of perspectives on the history and archaeology of the Lower Danube area during the sixth and seventh centuries. Each approached a different aspect of the process of constructing a Slavic ethnie and each highlighted specific themes and arguments. This chapter will review those themes, but will also attempt to string them all together into a tripartite conclusion. In doing so, it will focus on the major issues presented in the introduction the migration and the making of the Slavs. Though in agreement with those who maintain that the history of the Slavs began in the sixth century, I argue that the Slavs were an invention of the sixth century. Inventing, however, presupposed both imagining or labeling by outsiders and self-identification.
MIGRATION
A brief examination of the historiography of the "Slavic problem" yields an important conclusion the dominant discourse in Slavic studies, that of "expert" linguists and archaeologists, profoundly influenced the study of the early Slavs. Though the evidence, both historical and archaeological, presented itself in a historical light, historians were expected merely to comb the written sources for evidence to match what was already known from the linguistic-archaeological model. Because this model was based on widely spread ideas about such critical concepts as culture, migration, and language, the basic assumptions on which the model was based were rarely, if ever, questioned. One such assumption was that ethnies, like languages originate in an Urheimat and then expand over large areas through migration. Migration was defined in the terms of the Kulturkreis school, as the relatively rapid spread of racial and cultural elements. This led many scholars to abandon a serious consideration of the historical evidence and to postulate instead a Slavic Urheimat located in the marches of the Pripet river. Chased from their homeland in the North by the rigors of the harsh climate, the Slavs then inundated Eastern Europe. A Slavic homeland implied, however, that the history of the Slavs was older than the first Slavic raids known from historical sources. The cornerstone of all theories attempting to project the Slavs into prehistory was Jordanes' Getica. Jordanes equated the Sclavenes and Antes with the Venethi also known from much earlier sources, such as Pliny the Elder, Tacitus, and Ptolemy. This made it possible to claim the Venedi of Tacitus, Pliny, and Ptolemy for the Slavic history. It also provided a meaning to archaeological research of “Slavic antiquity”. A Polish linguist, Tadeusz Lehr-Spławinski, first suggested that the archeological culture of the Vistula basin during the first century BC to the first century AD, which was known as the Przeworsk culture, was that of Tacitus’ Venedi. Soviet archaeologists argued that the Slavic Venethi werethe majority of the population in the area covered by the Chernyakhov culture of the fourth century AD. They claimed that by AD 300, the Antes separated themselves from the linguistic and archeological block of the Venedi, and were soon followed by the Sclavenes. More often than not, therefore, the task of the archaeologist was to illustrate conclusions already drawn from Jordanes' account of the Slavic Venethi.
Without any doubt, Jordanes had in mind contemporary concerns when dcscribing barbarians living beyond imperial frontiers. He also used written, ancient sources regarding the regions under his scrutiny. When applying such sources, however, what was his concept of geography? What was he thinking about the ethnographic material provided by his sourccs in the light of what was known to him about recent developments in thlose same regions? Why did he use three different names for what was apparently one group of people? In Chapter 2, as well as elsewhere, I attempted to answer these questions while addressing issues of authorship and chronology of sources. My argument is that instead of being an eyewitness account, Jordanes’ description of Sclavenes and Antes was based on two or more maps with different geographical projections, the imaginary space of which he filled with both sixth-century and much earlier ethnic names he found in varios sources. This seriously diminishes the value of the most important piece of evidence invoked by advocates of both a considerable antiquity of the Slavs and their migration from the North. Moreover, no source dated before Justinian’s reign (527-65) refers to Slavs or Slavic Venethi. Despite some overlap in timespans covered by Procopius’ Warsand the chronicle of Marcellinus Comes (including the continuation to 548 added by another author), there is no mention of Slaves in the chronicle. Procopius, on the other hand, made it very clear that a “Slavic problem” arose, along with others, only during Justinian’s reign.
The Slavs did not migrate from Pripet marshes because of hostile environmental conditions. Nor did they develop forms of social organization enabling them to cope with such conditions and presumably based on cooperation and social equality (zadruga). Niederle’s thesis does not stand against the existing evidence and has at its basis an outdated concept of migration. That ht emigrationist model should ba abandoned is also suggested by the archaeological evidence examined in Chapter 6. No class of evidence matches current models for the archaeological study of (pre)historic migration. More important, assemblages of the Lower Danube area, where, according to the migrationist model, the Slavs migrated from Pripet marshes, long antedate the earliest evidence available from assemblages in the alleged Urheimat. Short-distance population movements, but not migration, must have accompanied the implementation of a form of “itinerant agriculture,” which, though not based on the slash-and-burn method, may have encouraged settlement mobility.
That the Slavs were present on the northern bank of the Danube before the implementation of Justinian’s building program in the mid-500s is demonstrated by their raids known form Procopius. It will probably remain unknown whether or not any of the groups arguably living in contemporary settlements excavated by Romanian archaeologists called temselves Sclavenes or Antes. This, however, was the region form which Romanes recruited mercenaries for the war in Italy. This is also the region that produced the largest number of coins struck under Emperors Anastasius and Justin I, as well as during Justinian’s early regnal years. A small number of hoards with last coins minted during this period was also found in this area. It is hard to judge form the existing evidence, but from what we have it appears that the Slavic raids mentioned by Procopius originated in this same region. This may also explain why Chilbudius’ campaigns of the early 530s targated against Sclavenes, Antes, and Cutrigurs were directed to a region not far from the Danube river.
We are fortunate to have first-hand sources of information for the late 500s and the early 600s, such as the Strategikon, and the campaign diary used by Theophylact Simocatta’s Books VI-VIII. In both cases, our knowledbe, however restricted, of what was going on north of the Danube river is based, almost certainly, on eyewitness accounts. Neither Theophylact nor the author of the Strategikon, knew any other area of Slavic settlements except that located north of the Danube frontier. Furthermore, no clear evidence exists of an outright migration of th eSlavs (Sclavenes) tho the regions south of the Danube until the early years of Heraclius’ reign. Phocas’ revolt of 602 was not followed by an irresistible flood of Sclavenes submerging the Balkans. In fact, there are no raids recorded during Phoca’s reign, either by Sclavenes or by Avars. By contrast, large-scale raiding activities resumed during Heraclius’ early regnal years. This is also confirmed by the archaeolocical evidence discussed in Chapter 4. Some forts along the Danube or in the interior were destroyed by fire at some point between Jistinian0’s and Maurice’s reigns. In many cases, however, restoration followed destruction and forts were abandoned at various dates without signs of violence. After Maurice’s assassination, Phocas’ army returned to the Danube and remained there at least until 605, if not 620. This is clearly attested by Sebeos and does not contradict in any way what we know form the archaeological and numismatic evidence. The earliest archeaeological evidence of settlement assemblages postdating the general withdrawl of Roman armies from the Balkans is that of the 700s. This suggests that there was no “Slavic tide” in the Balkans following the presumed collapse of the Danube frontier. In addition, the archaeological evidence confirms the picture drawn form the analysis of written sources, namely that the “Slavs” were isolated pockets of population in various areas of the Balkans, which seem to have experienced serious demographic decline in the seventh century.
The discussion in Chapter 4 has been based on the concept that the disintegration of the military system in the Balkans, which Justinian implemented in the mid-500s, was the result not so much of the destruction inflicted by barbarian invasions, as of serious economic and financial problems caused both by the emperor’s policies elsewhere and by the impossibility of providing sufficient economic support to his gigantic building program of defense. This conclusion is substantiated by the analysis of sixth-century Byzantine coin hoards, which suggest that inflation, not barbarian raids, was responsible for high rates of non-retrieval.
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIE: THE VIEW FORM THE INSIDE
After Chilbudius’ death in 533, there was a drastic change in Justinian’s agenda in the Balkans. Form this moment until Maurice’s campaigns of the 590s, no offensive strategy underpinned imperial policies in the area. Instead, Justinian began an impressive plan of fortification, of a size and quality the Balkans had never witnessed before. The project, or at least the most important part of it, was probably completed in some twenty years. It was completed in its basic lines when Procopius finished Book IV of his Buildings. In addition, Justinian remodelled the administrative structure of the Balkans an created the quaestura exercitus in order to support both financially and militarily those border provinces which were most affected by his building program. He also shifted military responsibilities form army generals to local authorities, especially bishops (novel II).
These measures were not taken in response to any major threat, for Roman troops were still in control of the left bank of the Danube, possibly thorugh bridge-heads such as those of Turnu Severin (Drobeta) and Celei (Sucidava). This is shown by the edict 13, issued in 538, which clearly stated that troops were still sent (if only as a form of punishment) north of the Danube river, “in order to watch at the frontier of that place.”
In addition to military and administrative measures, Justinian offered his alliance to the Antes (foedus of 545) and began to recruit mercenaries from among both Sclavenes and Antes for his war in Italy. All this suggests that Chilbudius’ campaigns of the early 530s opened a series of very aggressive measures on the Danube frontier, which were meant to consolidate the Roman military infrastructure in the Balkans. It is during this period of aggressive intrusion into affairs north of the Danube frontier that Sclavenes and Antes entered the orbit of Roman interests. Justinian’s measures were meant to stabilize the situation in barbaricum, which is why the foedus with the Antes was only signed after the end of the war between Antes and Sclavenes. Whether or not he intended to create a buffer zone between the Danube frontier and the steppe corridor to the northeast, Justinian’s goal was only partially fulfilled. Two devastating invasions of the Cutrigurs, in 539/40 and 558/9, respectively, borke through both Justinian’s system of alliances and his fortified frontier. None of the subsequent Sclavene raids can be compared in either size or consequences to the Cutrigur invasions. However, knowing that the first recorded raid of the Sclavenes is in 545, it is possible that Sclavene raiding was a response to Justinian’s aggressive policies, with both the fortified frontier and his barbarian allies. The Sclavenes may have felt encouraged by the Cutrigur breakthrough of 540, but it is no accident that their first raid coincided with Justinian’s alliance with the Antes.
The interruption of Sclavene raids coincides with the completion of the building program. With the exception of Zabergan’s invasion of 558/9, there were no raids across the Danube for twenty-five years. This is an indication of the efficiency of the defensive system, consisting of three interrelated fortification lines, the strongest of which was not along the Danube, but along the Stara Planina. Later, this grandiose program was extended to the northwestern Balkans, following the defeat of the Ostrogoths and the conquest of Dalmatia. Along the Danube and in the immediate hinterland, forts were relatively small (less than 1 hectare of enclosed area). Each one may have been garrisoned by a numerus (tagma), the minimal unit of the early Byzantine army, with up to 500 men. This may explain why small armies of Sclavenes (such as those responsible for the raids in the late 540s and early 550s) had no problems taking a relatively large number of forts. It also explains why Sclavene or Avar armies, no matter how large, moved with remarkable speed after crossing the Danube, without encountering any major resistance. The excavation of these forts and the estimation of the number of soldiers who may have manned these forts in the Iron Gates area indicate that the entire sector may have relied for its defense on forces amounting to some 5,000 men, the equivalent of a Roman legion. If, as argued in Chapter 7, the population of a Sclavene χωρίον was somewhat inferior in size to one or two bandons (400 to 800 men), we may be able to visualize the effort of mobilizing warriors for a successful raid across the Danube, which a great-man like Ardagastus may have faced. It is hard to believe that any chief was able to raise an army of 100,000, as maintained by Menander the Guardsman. The 5,000 warriors who attacked Thessalonica at some point before 586, nevertheless, is a likely figure. In any case, there is no reason to doubt the ability of Archbishop John, who may have been an eyewitness, to give a gross estimate of the enemy’s force. If so, then this indicates that raids strong enough to reach distant targets, such as Thessalonica, usually aimed at mobilizing a military force roughly equivalent to a Roman legion. Furthermore, there is no evidence, until the early regnal years of Heraclius, of an outright migration of the Slavs (Sclavenes) to the region south of the Danube river. No evidence exists that Romans ever tried to prevent the crossing, despite the existence of a Danube military fleet. Moreover, all major confrontations with Sclavene armies or “throngs” took place south of the Stara Planina mountains.
Nevertheless, the efficiency of the fortified frontier, at least in its initial phase, cannot be doubted. During the last fifteen years of Justinian’s reign, no Slavic raid crossed the Danube. The implementation of the fortified frontier seems to have been accompanied by its economic “closure.” This is shown by the absence of both copper and gold coins dated between 545 and 565 in both stray finds and hoards found in Romania. The economic “closure” was not deliberate, for it is likely that the strain on coin circulation, which is also visible in hoards found south of the Danube frontier, was caused by the very execution of Justinian’s gigantic plan. Fewer coins were now withdrawn from circulation, and even fewer found their way into hoards. It is possible, however, that the implementation of the fortified frontier strained not only the coin circulation within and outside the Empire, but also economic relations between communities living north and south of the Danube frontier, respectively.
The evidence of hoards shows that most were equivalent to the cost of one or two modii of Egyptian wheat. We can speculate that hoards found north of the Danube were payments for small quantities of grain sold to soldiers in sixth-century forts south of the Danube. In any case, these hoards, which primarily consist of copper, testify to trading activity. Stray finds of coins struck for Justinian and his followers, some of which were found in settlement contexts, confirm the hypothesis that Byzantine coins were used for commercial and non-commercial transactions in communities living north of the Danube. Whether or not these coins were used as “primitive money”, their very existence presupposes that copper coinage was of some value even outside the system which guaranteed its presumably fiduciary value. If so, the inflation delineated by the analysis of hoards found in the Balkans (south of the Danube river), which became visible especially after 550, as the purchasing power of the follies decreased drastically, as well as the economic strains of the general circulation of goods, may have affected also the owners of the Romanian hoards. It is interesting to note, therefore, that between 545 and 565 the coin circulation was interrupted both north and south of the Danube river. This interruption was most probably accompanied by a strong crisis in trading activities across the Danube and subsequent scarcity of goods of Roman provenance, which may have been obtained by such means and played, as shown in Chapter 6, an important role as prestige goods. This may have increased the level of social competition and encouraged the rise of leaders whose basis of power was now warfare. It is most probably during this period that we can see the first signs of emblemic styles in the material culture changes described in Chapter 6. Great-men, like
Ardagastus, and big-men, like the leaders mentioned by Pseudo-Caesarius, represented difierent responses to these historical conditions. These two forms of power may not only have coexisted, but also have been used by the same individuals. One way or another, both forms implied access to prestige goods, the quautity of which, if we are to believe Menander the Guardsman, was considerable. It is because he knew that he would find the land of the Sclavenes "full of gold" that Bayan, the qagan of the Avars, decided to launch his punitive expedition against Dauritas and his fellow chiefs. It is because of prestige goods, such as gold, silver, horses, and weapons, that the Sclavene warriors of 581, according to John of Ephesus, were still ravaging the Balkan provinces in 584. Finally, the evidence of amphoras found on sites north of the Dauube frontier, many of which are from the second half the sixth century, points to the same direction. Olive oil, wine, or garum were as good for showing off as horses and weapons. However, Byzantium was not the only source of prestige goods. The study of "Slavic" bow fibulae in Chapter 6 highlighted multiple and very complicated networks for the procurement of such goods. Finally, the analysis of hoards of silver in Chapter 4 and that of silver and bronze in Chapter 5 suggests that around AD 600, this was by no means a unique phenomenon.
As its title suggests, the subject matter of this book is not the Slavs, but the process leading to what is now as "the Slavs". This process was a function of both ethnic formation and ethnic identification. In both cases, the "Slavs" were the object, not the subject. The preceding chapters have presented a series of perspectives on the history and archaeology of the Lower Danube area during the sixth and seventh centuries. Each approached a different aspect of the process of constructing a Slavic ethnie and each highlighted specific themes and arguments. This chapter will review those themes, but will also attempt to string them all together into a tripartite conclusion. In doing so, it will focus on the major issues presented in the introduction the migration and the making of the Slavs. Though in agreement with those who maintain that the history of the Slavs began in the sixth century, I argue that the Slavs were an invention of the sixth century. Inventing, however, presupposed both imagining or labeling by outsiders and self-identification.
MIGRATION
A brief examination of the historiography of the "Slavic problem" yields an important conclusion the dominant discourse in Slavic studies, that of "expert" linguists and archaeologists, profoundly influenced the study of the early Slavs. Though the evidence, both historical and archaeological, presented itself in a historical light, historians were expected merely to comb the written sources for evidence to match what was already known from the linguistic-archaeological model. Because this model was based on widely spread ideas about such critical concepts as culture, migration, and language, the basic assumptions on which the model was based were rarely, if ever, questioned. One such assumption was that ethnies, like languages originate in an Urheimat and then expand over large areas through migration. Migration was defined in the terms of the Kulturkreis school, as the relatively rapid spread of racial and cultural elements. This led many scholars to abandon a serious consideration of the historical evidence and to postulate instead a Slavic Urheimat located in the marches of the Pripet river. Chased from their homeland in the North by the rigors of the harsh climate, the Slavs then inundated Eastern Europe. A Slavic homeland implied, however, that the history of the Slavs was older than the first Slavic raids known from historical sources. The cornerstone of all theories attempting to project the Slavs into prehistory was Jordanes' Getica. Jordanes equated the Sclavenes and Antes with the Venethi also known from much earlier sources, such as Pliny the Elder, Tacitus, and Ptolemy. This made it possible to claim the Venedi of Tacitus, Pliny, and Ptolemy for the Slavic history. It also provided a meaning to archaeological research of “Slavic antiquity”. A Polish linguist, Tadeusz Lehr-Spławinski, first suggested that the archeological culture of the Vistula basin during the first century BC to the first century AD, which was known as the Przeworsk culture, was that of Tacitus’ Venedi. Soviet archaeologists argued that the Slavic Venethi werethe majority of the population in the area covered by the Chernyakhov culture of the fourth century AD. They claimed that by AD 300, the Antes separated themselves from the linguistic and archeological block of the Venedi, and were soon followed by the Sclavenes. More often than not, therefore, the task of the archaeologist was to illustrate conclusions already drawn from Jordanes' account of the Slavic Venethi.
Without any doubt, Jordanes had in mind contemporary concerns when dcscribing barbarians living beyond imperial frontiers. He also used written, ancient sources regarding the regions under his scrutiny. When applying such sources, however, what was his concept of geography? What was he thinking about the ethnographic material provided by his sourccs in the light of what was known to him about recent developments in thlose same regions? Why did he use three different names for what was apparently one group of people? In Chapter 2, as well as elsewhere, I attempted to answer these questions while addressing issues of authorship and chronology of sources. My argument is that instead of being an eyewitness account, Jordanes’ description of Sclavenes and Antes was based on two or more maps with different geographical projections, the imaginary space of which he filled with both sixth-century and much earlier ethnic names he found in varios sources. This seriously diminishes the value of the most important piece of evidence invoked by advocates of both a considerable antiquity of the Slavs and their migration from the North. Moreover, no source dated before Justinian’s reign (527-65) refers to Slavs or Slavic Venethi. Despite some overlap in timespans covered by Procopius’ Warsand the chronicle of Marcellinus Comes (including the continuation to 548 added by another author), there is no mention of Slaves in the chronicle. Procopius, on the other hand, made it very clear that a “Slavic problem” arose, along with others, only during Justinian’s reign.
The Slavs did not migrate from Pripet marshes because of hostile environmental conditions. Nor did they develop forms of social organization enabling them to cope with such conditions and presumably based on cooperation and social equality (zadruga). Niederle’s thesis does not stand against the existing evidence and has at its basis an outdated concept of migration. That ht emigrationist model should ba abandoned is also suggested by the archaeological evidence examined in Chapter 6. No class of evidence matches current models for the archaeological study of (pre)historic migration. More important, assemblages of the Lower Danube area, where, according to the migrationist model, the Slavs migrated from Pripet marshes, long antedate the earliest evidence available from assemblages in the alleged Urheimat. Short-distance population movements, but not migration, must have accompanied the implementation of a form of “itinerant agriculture,” which, though not based on the slash-and-burn method, may have encouraged settlement mobility.
That the Slavs were present on the northern bank of the Danube before the implementation of Justinian’s building program in the mid-500s is demonstrated by their raids known form Procopius. It will probably remain unknown whether or not any of the groups arguably living in contemporary settlements excavated by Romanian archaeologists called temselves Sclavenes or Antes. This, however, was the region form which Romanes recruited mercenaries for the war in Italy. This is also the region that produced the largest number of coins struck under Emperors Anastasius and Justin I, as well as during Justinian’s early regnal years. A small number of hoards with last coins minted during this period was also found in this area. It is hard to judge form the existing evidence, but from what we have it appears that the Slavic raids mentioned by Procopius originated in this same region. This may also explain why Chilbudius’ campaigns of the early 530s targated against Sclavenes, Antes, and Cutrigurs were directed to a region not far from the Danube river.
We are fortunate to have first-hand sources of information for the late 500s and the early 600s, such as the Strategikon, and the campaign diary used by Theophylact Simocatta’s Books VI-VIII. In both cases, our knowledbe, however restricted, of what was going on north of the Danube river is based, almost certainly, on eyewitness accounts. Neither Theophylact nor the author of the Strategikon, knew any other area of Slavic settlements except that located north of the Danube frontier. Furthermore, no clear evidence exists of an outright migration of th eSlavs (Sclavenes) tho the regions south of the Danube until the early years of Heraclius’ reign. Phocas’ revolt of 602 was not followed by an irresistible flood of Sclavenes submerging the Balkans. In fact, there are no raids recorded during Phoca’s reign, either by Sclavenes or by Avars. By contrast, large-scale raiding activities resumed during Heraclius’ early regnal years. This is also confirmed by the archaeolocical evidence discussed in Chapter 4. Some forts along the Danube or in the interior were destroyed by fire at some point between Jistinian0’s and Maurice’s reigns. In many cases, however, restoration followed destruction and forts were abandoned at various dates without signs of violence. After Maurice’s assassination, Phocas’ army returned to the Danube and remained there at least until 605, if not 620. This is clearly attested by Sebeos and does not contradict in any way what we know form the archaeological and numismatic evidence. The earliest archeaeological evidence of settlement assemblages postdating the general withdrawl of Roman armies from the Balkans is that of the 700s. This suggests that there was no “Slavic tide” in the Balkans following the presumed collapse of the Danube frontier. In addition, the archaeological evidence confirms the picture drawn form the analysis of written sources, namely that the “Slavs” were isolated pockets of population in various areas of the Balkans, which seem to have experienced serious demographic decline in the seventh century.
The discussion in Chapter 4 has been based on the concept that the disintegration of the military system in the Balkans, which Justinian implemented in the mid-500s, was the result not so much of the destruction inflicted by barbarian invasions, as of serious economic and financial problems caused both by the emperor’s policies elsewhere and by the impossibility of providing sufficient economic support to his gigantic building program of defense. This conclusion is substantiated by the analysis of sixth-century Byzantine coin hoards, which suggest that inflation, not barbarian raids, was responsible for high rates of non-retrieval.
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIE: THE VIEW FORM THE INSIDE
After Chilbudius’ death in 533, there was a drastic change in Justinian’s agenda in the Balkans. Form this moment until Maurice’s campaigns of the 590s, no offensive strategy underpinned imperial policies in the area. Instead, Justinian began an impressive plan of fortification, of a size and quality the Balkans had never witnessed before. The project, or at least the most important part of it, was probably completed in some twenty years. It was completed in its basic lines when Procopius finished Book IV of his Buildings. In addition, Justinian remodelled the administrative structure of the Balkans an created the quaestura exercitus in order to support both financially and militarily those border provinces which were most affected by his building program. He also shifted military responsibilities form army generals to local authorities, especially bishops (novel II).
These measures were not taken in response to any major threat, for Roman troops were still in control of the left bank of the Danube, possibly thorugh bridge-heads such as those of Turnu Severin (Drobeta) and Celei (Sucidava). This is shown by the edict 13, issued in 538, which clearly stated that troops were still sent (if only as a form of punishment) north of the Danube river, “in order to watch at the frontier of that place.”
In addition to military and administrative measures, Justinian offered his alliance to the Antes (foedus of 545) and began to recruit mercenaries from among both Sclavenes and Antes for his war in Italy. All this suggests that Chilbudius’ campaigns of the early 530s opened a series of very aggressive measures on the Danube frontier, which were meant to consolidate the Roman military infrastructure in the Balkans. It is during this period of aggressive intrusion into affairs north of the Danube frontier that Sclavenes and Antes entered the orbit of Roman interests. Justinian’s measures were meant to stabilize the situation in barbaricum, which is why the foedus with the Antes was only signed after the end of the war between Antes and Sclavenes. Whether or not he intended to create a buffer zone between the Danube frontier and the steppe corridor to the northeast, Justinian’s goal was only partially fulfilled. Two devastating invasions of the Cutrigurs, in 539/40 and 558/9, respectively, borke through both Justinian’s system of alliances and his fortified frontier. None of the subsequent Sclavene raids can be compared in either size or consequences to the Cutrigur invasions. However, knowing that the first recorded raid of the Sclavenes is in 545, it is possible that Sclavene raiding was a response to Justinian’s aggressive policies, with both the fortified frontier and his barbarian allies. The Sclavenes may have felt encouraged by the Cutrigur breakthrough of 540, but it is no accident that their first raid coincided with Justinian’s alliance with the Antes.
The interruption of Sclavene raids coincides with the completion of the building program. With the exception of Zabergan’s invasion of 558/9, there were no raids across the Danube for twenty-five years. This is an indication of the efficiency of the defensive system, consisting of three interrelated fortification lines, the strongest of which was not along the Danube, but along the Stara Planina. Later, this grandiose program was extended to the northwestern Balkans, following the defeat of the Ostrogoths and the conquest of Dalmatia. Along the Danube and in the immediate hinterland, forts were relatively small (less than 1 hectare of enclosed area). Each one may have been garrisoned by a numerus (tagma), the minimal unit of the early Byzantine army, with up to 500 men. This may explain why small armies of Sclavenes (such as those responsible for the raids in the late 540s and early 550s) had no problems taking a relatively large number of forts. It also explains why Sclavene or Avar armies, no matter how large, moved with remarkable speed after crossing the Danube, without encountering any major resistance. The excavation of these forts and the estimation of the number of soldiers who may have manned these forts in the Iron Gates area indicate that the entire sector may have relied for its defense on forces amounting to some 5,000 men, the equivalent of a Roman legion. If, as argued in Chapter 7, the population of a Sclavene χωρίον was somewhat inferior in size to one or two bandons (400 to 800 men), we may be able to visualize the effort of mobilizing warriors for a successful raid across the Danube, which a great-man like Ardagastus may have faced. It is hard to believe that any chief was able to raise an army of 100,000, as maintained by Menander the Guardsman. The 5,000 warriors who attacked Thessalonica at some point before 586, nevertheless, is a likely figure. In any case, there is no reason to doubt the ability of Archbishop John, who may have been an eyewitness, to give a gross estimate of the enemy’s force. If so, then this indicates that raids strong enough to reach distant targets, such as Thessalonica, usually aimed at mobilizing a military force roughly equivalent to a Roman legion. Furthermore, there is no evidence, until the early regnal years of Heraclius, of an outright migration of the Slavs (Sclavenes) to the region south of the Danube river. No evidence exists that Romans ever tried to prevent the crossing, despite the existence of a Danube military fleet. Moreover, all major confrontations with Sclavene armies or “throngs” took place south of the Stara Planina mountains.
Nevertheless, the efficiency of the fortified frontier, at least in its initial phase, cannot be doubted. During the last fifteen years of Justinian’s reign, no Slavic raid crossed the Danube. The implementation of the fortified frontier seems to have been accompanied by its economic “closure.” This is shown by the absence of both copper and gold coins dated between 545 and 565 in both stray finds and hoards found in Romania. The economic “closure” was not deliberate, for it is likely that the strain on coin circulation, which is also visible in hoards found south of the Danube frontier, was caused by the very execution of Justinian’s gigantic plan. Fewer coins were now withdrawn from circulation, and even fewer found their way into hoards. It is possible, however, that the implementation of the fortified frontier strained not only the coin circulation within and outside the Empire, but also economic relations between communities living north and south of the Danube frontier, respectively.
The evidence of hoards shows that most were equivalent to the cost of one or two modii of Egyptian wheat. We can speculate that hoards found north of the Danube were payments for small quantities of grain sold to soldiers in sixth-century forts south of the Danube. In any case, these hoards, which primarily consist of copper, testify to trading activity. Stray finds of coins struck for Justinian and his followers, some of which were found in settlement contexts, confirm the hypothesis that Byzantine coins were used for commercial and non-commercial transactions in communities living north of the Danube. Whether or not these coins were used as “primitive money”, their very existence presupposes that copper coinage was of some value even outside the system which guaranteed its presumably fiduciary value. If so, the inflation delineated by the analysis of hoards found in the Balkans (south of the Danube river), which became visible especially after 550, as the purchasing power of the follies decreased drastically, as well as the economic strains of the general circulation of goods, may have affected also the owners of the Romanian hoards. It is interesting to note, therefore, that between 545 and 565 the coin circulation was interrupted both north and south of the Danube river. This interruption was most probably accompanied by a strong crisis in trading activities across the Danube and subsequent scarcity of goods of Roman provenance, which may have been obtained by such means and played, as shown in Chapter 6, an important role as prestige goods. This may have increased the level of social competition and encouraged the rise of leaders whose basis of power was now warfare. It is most probably during this period that we can see the first signs of emblemic styles in the material culture changes described in Chapter 6. Great-men, like
Ardagastus, and big-men, like the leaders mentioned by Pseudo-Caesarius, represented difierent responses to these historical conditions. These two forms of power may not only have coexisted, but also have been used by the same individuals. One way or another, both forms implied access to prestige goods, the quautity of which, if we are to believe Menander the Guardsman, was considerable. It is because he knew that he would find the land of the Sclavenes "full of gold" that Bayan, the qagan of the Avars, decided to launch his punitive expedition against Dauritas and his fellow chiefs. It is because of prestige goods, such as gold, silver, horses, and weapons, that the Sclavene warriors of 581, according to John of Ephesus, were still ravaging the Balkan provinces in 584. Finally, the evidence of amphoras found on sites north of the Dauube frontier, many of which are from the second half the sixth century, points to the same direction. Olive oil, wine, or garum were as good for showing off as horses and weapons. However, Byzantium was not the only source of prestige goods. The study of "Slavic" bow fibulae in Chapter 6 highlighted multiple and very complicated networks for the procurement of such goods. Finally, the analysis of hoards of silver in Chapter 4 and that of silver and bronze in Chapter 5 suggests that around AD 600, this was by no means a unique phenomenon.
